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 ACE Research Vignette #042: Nascent ventures’ surprising resistance to 
macroeconomic crisis 
 
This series of research vignettes is aimed at sharing current and interesting research findings from our team of 
international entrepreneurship researchers. This vignette, written by Professor Per Davidsson, reports findings on how 
the onset of the Global Financial Crisis affected “nascent ventures”, i.e., on-going business start-up efforts.   
 
Background and Research Question 
 
Prior research has suggested that the youngest and smallest firms in the economy are also the most vulnerable, in the 
sense that they are more likely to close down than are larger and more established firms. However, there is also research 
that points out that small and young firm can be very resilient. The young and small, it is argued, can manoeuvre quickly 
and better adapt as needed compared to larger and older firms, which are more set in their ways. In line with this notion, 
there is research to suggest that although small and young firm have higher rates of discontinuance during in an 
economic crisis—just like they have under more normal conditions—they are relatively less hit by the crisis than are older 
and larger firms, who can dramatically increase their rates of closure under such conditions. There is also research that 
suggests that more ambitious start-ups—for example those that are more innovative, growth oriented, and depending on 
external finance—are harder hit than other young firms when an economic crisis sets in. If so, it could mean that the 
economy temporarily or permanently loses its most valuable new entrants due to the crisis.  
 
However, no prior research has examined how nascent ventures—i.e., early start-up attempts that have not yet become 
operational businesses—are affected by a major, macroeconomic crisis. Hence, our research questions become: 
 
How does the onset of a macroeconomic crisis affect nascent ventures? Are ambitious and innovative ventures more 
strongly affected compared to more mundane start-ups?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How We Investigated This 
 
The Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial Emergence (CAUSEE) followed a large, random sample of nascent 
ventures in Australia over several years. Because of the size of the study, the first round of interviews was spread out 
from May 2007 and well into 2008. Each year, each firm was contacted again as close as possible to 12 months after the 
previous interview. The Lehman Brothers collapse, which is widely considered the starting point of the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC) occurred on October 15, 2008. This was in the middle of the second round of interviewing, which means that 
roughly half of the ventures were followed up before, and the other half after the onset of the GFC. This creates a natural 
experiment situation which makes it possible to credibly isolate effects of the crisis from other influences. We compared 
founders re-interviewed before and after the onset of the GFC regarding their propensity to a) disengage from the start-
up, b) delay it (reducing work effort); compensate (by increasing work effort) or adapt (by simplifying the venture as 
Macroeconomic crisis 
Type and stage of venture 
 - Disengagement   -Delay 
- Compensation    - Adaptation 
 regards level of innovation and growth orientation). We also examined whether the effects of the crisis were different for 
more and less ambitious ventures, and depending on how far progressed the start-up was at the time of the first 
interview. For the disengagement outcome, 493 ventures could be used in the analysis. The other responses are only 
possible for ventures that continue, which was true for 337 cases.   
 
It has been concluded in arrears that Australia was far less hit by the GFC than other countries. However, this was not at 
all clear when our interviewing took place, i.e., the months immediately before and after the onset of the crisis. Especially 
during the first three months after Lehman Brothers’ collapse there were very dramatic drops in stock prices, the value of 
the Australian dollar, Reserve Bank cash rate, business confidence, and other economic indicators. At the time, the signs 
of crisis were well on par with the developments in Europe and the US.    
 
Findings 
 
The clearest finding is the startling lack of strong responses to the GFC. For the most part, the behaviour of nascent 
ventures was not affected much at all. Founders of start-ups that were further progressed towards becoming up and 
running firms actually became less likely to disengage after the onset of the GFC, which may be because other alternatives 
available to these individuals also worsened. Those at early stages tended to become more prone to disengage as 
expected, but this effect is statistically uncertain. Our results suggest that observable declines in new business 
registrations in a macroeconomic crisis are due to mechanisms other than making on-going start-up efforts fall over, e.g., 
fewer new branches being formed by large firms. There were no clear signs that founders tried to manoeuvre through the 
crisis by delaying, working harder to compensate, or adapting by changing the venture and/or their aspirations for it. 
Importantly, there was a statistically significant tendency towards increased disengagement for nascent “high tech” 
ventures. However this did not replicate with other indicators of a more ambitious start-up, such as use of external 
finance or having an incorporated legal form rather than running the business as a sole proprietorship or partnership. 
Somewhat surprisingly, we did not find evidence of widespread “credit crunch” problems. Our overall results were robust 
to a large number of alternative tests in terms of assumptions regarding when the GFC effect set in; what specific analysis 
method to use, and how to measure the alternative, possible responses.  
 
Business and Policy Advice 
 
There is increasing policy interest in business start-ups, and these start-ups are increasingly identifiable at early stages 
through business incubators and various associations and communities. It is therefore conceivable that policy makers 
would consider measures to keep nascent ventures alive through a crisis, similar to cash handouts to consumers in order 
to keep up demand. With the possible exception of “high tech” start-ups, our unique, natural experiment—which 
arguably is the only evidence available on this particular matter—does not indicate that such measures are justified. 
Nascent ventures in general do not seem to react much at all to a macroeconomic crisis. This may be because they are not 
yet fully integrated into the economy – the venture is not yet the founder’s main source of income, and they may not yet 
incur significant running costs that need to be covered. It may also be because these ventures’ immediate environment – 
the few, key suppliers and customers they rely on – are not much affected in most cases. Thus, nascent ventures seem 
relatively resilient in crisis, but this does not imply creative counter-action. Rather, they just seem to “see it through”. 
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